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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
GARY WAYNE OSTLER. 
RULING 
Case No. 033901263 
Judge: L.A. DEVER 
The above entitled matter is before the Court on the Estate's Motion To Dismiss 
Complaint of Adam Kunic Moses Walker ("Plaintiff'). Having reviewed the Estate's 
Motion and Opposition thereto; and, having heard the arguments on January 22, 2008, 
the Court makes the following Ruling. 
Plaintiff', a minor, by and through his Guardian, Melissa M. Walker, alleges that 
Gary Wayne Ostler ("Decedent"), caused the death of his father on July 13, 2003, by 
negligently piloting his airplane into the Pacific Ocean. The Decedent, Plaintiff's father, 
e and others died in the crash. (Estate's Mot. To Dismiss Compl., 1-2). Pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated 75-3-801 ', notice to Decedent's creditors was first 
a 'plaintiff was born on March 27, 2004, and DNA testing for paternity was completed on April 8, 2004. (Estate's Mot. To Dismiss Compl., 4). 
2 Subsection One (1) provides in relevant part: "Unless notice has already been given under this 
section, a personal representative upon his appointment shall publish a notice to creditors once a week for 
three successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county announcing the personal 
representative's appointment and address and notifying creditors of the estate to present their claims 
within three months after the date of the first publication of the notice or be forever barred." (2003). 
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published on September 26, 2003, Id. at 3. Therefore, the deadline, as asserted by 
the Estate, for Plaintiff's wrongful death claim, as filed in his Complaint of June 29, 
2007, was the earlier of December 26, 2003, consistent with Section 75-3-801 (1) or, 
July 13, 2004, pursuant to Section 75-3-803(1)3. Id. 
Plaintiff initially filed his claim against the Estate on April 16, 2007, more than 
three years after the prescribed deadline i.e. the creditor's deadline, had passed. Id. 
The Estate filed a notice of Disallowance of Claim disallowing Plaintiff's claim on the 
basis that it was untimely under both Sections 75-3-801 (1) and 75-3-803(1). Id. at 2. 
The Estate asserts that Plaintiff's claim is barred, Utah Code Ann. 9 75-3-804(1)(b) 
* (2004)4, and, that the tolling statute, Utah Code Ann. 5 75-12-36 (2004)5, has no impact 
'"~11 claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of the decedent [the Estate 
asserts that Decedent caused the crash minutes before his own death], including claims of the state and 
any subdivision of it, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, 
founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not barred earlier by other statute of limitations, are barred 
against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless 
presented within the earlier of the following dates: 
(a) one year after the decedent's death; or 
(b) within the time provided by Subsection 75-3-801(2) for creditors who are given actual notice, 
and where notice is published, within the time provided in Subsection 75-3-801(1) for all claims 
barred by publication." 
(2003). 
4 Provides in relevant part: :The claimant may commence a proceeding against the personal 
representative in any court where the personal representative may be subjected to jurisdiction to obtain 
payment of the claim against the estate, but the commencement of the proceeding must occur within the 
time limited for presenting the claim." (emphasis added). 
'"If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real property, is at the time 
the cause of action accrued, either under the age of majority or mentally incompetent and without a legal 
guardian. the time of the disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action." 
ADD 0002 
on the time restrictions of the aforementioned Probate Code provisions. 
There has been little case law in Utah addressing whether the tolling statute tolls 
the time provisions in the Probate Code when a claimant is in the age of minority. In In 
re Estate of Garza, 725 P.2d 1328 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
although the claimants, - minor children of the deceased, filed their wrongful death claim 
approximately four-years after the death of their father, their claim was not barred by 
.two year statute of limitations for wrongful death claims as it was tolled during their 
minority. The key difference, however, between the case before this Court and 
Estate of Garza, is that the Garza childrens' guardian presented their claim against the 
estate two days before the end of the three-month period allowed for the presentment of 
claims after publication of notice was made to creditors. Id. at 1328-29. Similarly, in 
Ellis v. Estate of Ellis, 2007 UT 77, 169 P.3d 441, the Court states that "[b]ecause [Mrs. 
Ellis'] claim was brought more than a year after Mr. Ellis' death, the Estate's liability was 
limited to the extent of the decedent's insurance coverage." Id. at 73 (citing Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-3-803(1 )(a), 4(b) (1 993)). 
Because this is a matter of first impression, this Court looks to other jurisdictions 
to find persuasive authority. In re Estate of Daiqle, 634 P.2d 71 (Colo. 1981), presents 
facts and issues parallel to the one before this Court. 
On March 10, 1978, Daigle was operating a plane which crashed killing Daigle 
and his passenger Snyder. Id. at 73. Daigle's estate was opened on March 28, 1978. 
ADD 0003 
Id. The First National Bank of Denver was appointed as personal representative of 
-
Daigle's estate and issued notice to creditors. Id. August 7, 1978, was the last day for 
filing claims against the estate6. d. On September 7, 1978, the wife of Snyder filed a 
wrongful death claim on behalf of herself and her three minor children against the 
Daigle estate. Id. The personal representative disallowed the claim on the basis that it 
' 
was not filed prior to the last day fixed in the notice to the creditors. Id. Mrs. Snyder 
petitioned the court for allowance of the claim, contending that the children's claim was 
tolled by their minority. Id. 
The Colorado Supreme Court denied Mrs. Snyder's claim on behalf of children ' 
. 
explaining that the purpose of the probate code was to promote a speedy and efficient 
system for the settling the estate of the decedent making distribution to the successors7 
and, that tolling the prescribed time restrictions would render the estate's liability 
indeterminable. a. 76-77. While the court denied the children's claim as the Colorado 
Probate Code created a jurisdictional bar to claims untimely filed, the court did clarify 
'colorado Probate Code Section 15-12-801 (1980 Supp.) provides that "the notice to creditors 
shall fix a date for the filing of creditors' claims, which shall be not earlier than four months from the date of 
first publicat~on or one from the date of death, whichever occurs first." Id. at n.2; Compare C.R.S. €j 15-12- 
801 (1) (2007) ("Unless one year or more has elapsed since the death of the decedent, a personal 
representative shall cause a notice to creditors to be published in some daily or weekly newspaper 
published in the county in which the estate is being administered, or if there is no such newspaper, then in 
some newspaper of general circulation in an adjoining county. Such notice shall be published not less than 
three times, at least once during each of three successive calendar weeks"); Utah Code Ann. § 75-3- 
801 (1) at supra n.2. 
7 See Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-102(2): "The underlying purposes and policies of this code are: (c) 
To prornofea speedy and efficient system for administering the estate of the decedent and making 
distribution to his successors[.]" (2007). 
4 
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that "[tlhe Snyder children's claim, like that of Mrs. Snyder, is limited to the amount of 
liability insurance protecting the estate. a. at 77. The Utah Uniform Probate Code, 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(4)',. provides a similar provision as that referenced by the 
Daiqle court. 
In distinguishing between a nonclaim statuteg and a statute of limitations, the 
court explained: 
A nonclaim statute operates to deprive a court of jurisdiction. The 
personal representative of an estate can neither waive it nor toll it . . . . A 
nonclaim statute imposes a condition precedent to the enforcement of a 
right of action; that is to say, the claim must be presented within the time 
set in the notice to creditors or be barred. A statute of limitations, on the 
other hand, does not bar the right of action but only the remedy . . . . Such 
a statute may be tolled. Such a statute is a defense which is waived if not 
affirmatively pleaded. 
Id. at 75 (citation omitted) (emphasis in the original). The court further stated, "[i]f the 
-
legislature intended to exempt late claims by minors and other persons under disability 
form the j.urisdictional bar of the nonclaim statute it reasonably may be assumed that 
appropriate statutory language would have been included in section 15-1 2-8031°, to 
8 c c  Nothing in this section affects or prevents: . . . 
(b) to the limits of the insurance protection only, any proceeding to establish liability of the 
decedent or the personal representative for which he is protected by liability insurance;" 
0 Referencing the creditor's notice statute. See Utah Code Ann. 5 75-3-801; see also In re Estate 
of Anderson, 821 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1992) (referencing Utah's nonclaim statute). 
'O~arallef to relevant language in Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803. 
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accomplish this result." id. at 76. 
Similarly, this Court finds that Plaintiff's claim is barred except as allowed by Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-3-803 (4)(b). To hold otherwise, would frustrate the basic purpose of 
the Utah Probate Code and "would cast substantial doubt on the finality of any 
distribution to an heir or devisee and the distributee's right thereto." Id. (citations 
omitted); See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1001 et. seq. 
Based on the foregoing, the Estate's Motion is GRANTED. 
This Ruling stands as the Order of the Court. No further Order is required. 
Dated 2gth day of January, 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
GARY WAYNE OSTLER, 
Deceased. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF ESTATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
COMPLAINT OF ADAM KUNIC 
MOSES WALKER, A MINOR 
Probate No. 033901 263 
Judge L.A. Dever 
Douglas L Stowell, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Gary Ostler (the "Estate"), 
submits this reply memorandum in support of the Estate's motion to dismiss the complaint filed on 
June 29,2007 in this matter (the "Complaint") by Adam Kunic Moses Walker, a minor, by and . 
e through his Guardian, Melissa M. Walker ("Plaintiff'). 
BACKGROUND 
. - 
Plaintiff, a three-year old minor child, through his mother and legal guardian, Melissa Walker 
a ("Ms. Walker") is seeking to assert a time-barred wrongful death claim (the "Claim") against the 
Estate for the wrongful death of Plaintiffs father allegedly caused by Gary Ostler, the decedent of 
ADD 0008 
this   state'. The decedent Gary Ostler, and Plaintiffs father, died on July 13,2003 in a crash of an 
airplane piloted by Gary Ostler. Plaintiffs Claim is that Gary Ostler caused the wrongful death of 
Plaintiff's father on that date. The Estate was opened in a formal probate proceeding on September 
17,2003; notice to creditors was first published on September 26,2003; the deadline for presentment 
of the Claim was 90 days later, on December 26,2003; yet Plaintiff did not present the Claim to the 
Estate until more than three years after the deadline, on April 16,2007. When Plaintiff presented the 
Claim on April 16,2007, more than three years late, he admitted the late filing by also filing a 
. 
Petition for Leave to File Late Creditor's Claim. 
The Estate filed a Notice of Disallowance of Claim on May 2,2007, disallowing Plaintiffs 
Claim on the ground that it was forever barred by reason of its late presentment, Petitioner then filed 
a Complaint in this matter on June 29,2007 for the wrongful death of his father, notwithstanding the 
Estate's disallowance of the Claim. The Estate then filed the-present motion to dismiss the 1 
Complaint on the grounds that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the Complaint because presenting 
the Claim within the claim presentment deadline is a jurisdictional prerequisite. The above facts are 
not in dispute, but are set forth on the face of the pleadings in this matter. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
The Uniform Probate Code provides that all claims against a decedent's estate are forever 
. - 
barred unless they are "presented" before carefully defined deadlines. This claims presentment 
requirement is often referred to as the "nonclaim statute." Utah's enactment of the nonclaim statute 
is set forth in tJtah Code $ 75-3-803 and was discussed in the Estate's Motion to Dismiss. Under 
I The Estate has not conceded the paternity of the Plaintiff, but will assume that paternity has been established solely for 
purposes of this memorandum. 
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Utah's nonclaim statute, Plaintiffs Claim should have been presented by December 26,2003, which 
was 90 days after first publication of notice to creditors. 
Plaintiffs opposition memorandum does not cite any legal authority for permitting this Court . 
to allow Km to present his Claim more than three years late. Plaintiff cites only Utah's normal two- 
year wrongful death statute of limitations and the statute providing for the tolling of the normal , 
* statute .of limitations during a claimant's minority. The Estate's reply is that the nonclaim statute of . 
Utah's probate code clearly states that the claims presentment requirement supersedes, and shortkns, 
any other applicable statute of limitations and does not provide for tolling during minority. "All 
claims . . . if not barred earlier by other statute of limitations, are barred against the estate, the 
personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented within [the 
nonclaim statute deadlines]." Utah Code fj 75-3-803(1) (emphasis added). Likewise, Utah's general 
limitations statute itself states that it is superseded by any other more specific limitations period. 
"Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods prescribed in this chapter, . -. . except in 
specific cases where a different limitation is prescribed by statute." Utah Code 9 78-12-1 (emphasis 
added). Plaintiff does not cite any authority to the contrary. 
Plaintiff cites only one case in this section, In the Matter of Rolando S. Garza, Deceased, 725 
P.2d 1328 (Utah 1986)' yet Plaintiff admits in his discussion of that case that the claim in Gatza was . . 
presented two days before expiration of the claims presentment deadline. Thus Garza supports the 
0 
Estate's argument that the Claim is barred, not the Plaintiffs argument to the contrary. The Garza 
case was actuaIly about how the 90-day claims presentment deadline would be calculated and had 
0 nothing to do with making an exception to the claims presentment deadline for minor claimants. The 
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only similarity between the Garza case and this case is that they both involved wrongful death claims 
brought by minor children. 
Plaintiffs argument is not only incorrect, it would also turn Utah's probate administration on 
its head. Under Plaintiffs theory, Plaintiff could have waited eighteen years to present his claim, not 
just the four years that his mother actually took. If Plaintiffs argument is correct, the Estate, and 
every probate estate in Utah, wi!l be forced to remain open for at least eighteen years to allow for the 
possibility that'the decedent could have harmed a young child the day before he died, which child is 
allowed eighteen years to bring its claim. Four men died in the plane crash that took the life of 
Plaintiffs father. Who is to say that Plaintiff sfather or the other three men did not have or conceive 
other children in the weeks or months before then? The Estate was shocked and surprised to learn of 
the existence of the Plaintiff, four years late. But if it can happen once, it can happen again. 
The remainder of Plaintiffs argument is a plea to be allowed to file three years late based on 
three equitable factors: (I)  that family members of the decedent induced Ms, Walker to forgo legal 
m 
counsel with promises of voluntary financial support, (2) that the claims presentment deadline 
expired before Plaintiff was even born, and (3) that the Estate will not be harmed by allowing this 
Claim because the Estate is still open. The Court should disregard these equitable arguments 
because Plaintiff has not provided any legal authority that would permit the Court to waive 
jurisdictional prerequisites on the basis of equitable factors.' The Estate is entitled to an order of 
dismissal on the face of the pleadings themselves, which include Plaintiffs admission that the Claim 
was presented after the nonclaim statute deadline. 
2 See  Mountain Am. Credit Union v. McClellan, 854 P.2d 590, 591 (Ct. App. Utah 1993) ("A court may enterjudgment 
on the pleadings when the moving party is entitled to judgment on the face of the pleadings themselves."). 
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Addressing these three equitable arguments very briefly, however, as to the first allegation 
that family members of the decedent induced Ms. Walker to forgo legal counsel with promises of 
voluntary financial support, the Estate points out that the Personal Representative, Douglas Stowell, 
e .  
is not a family member and had no knowledge of Ms. Walker, the Plaintiff, or the Claim until it was 
presented to him four years late. Plaintiff has cited no authority that would impute the knowledge or 
promises of potential heirs and other claimants to an unrelated personal representative. 
Ms. Walker's second equitable argument is that it is unfair to hold her to the statutory clalms 
presentment deadline because Plaintiff was not born until three months after it expired. But even if 
this justified some delay, Plaintiff does not explain why she is entitled as a matter of equity and 
fairness to take three full years after birth to present the claim. Moreover, Ms. Walker admits in her 
Affidavit that she was certain as to Plaintiffs paternity as soon as she discovered she was pregnant 
towards the end of July, 2003, five months before the claims presentment deadline. The nonclaim 
statute does not require that suit be filed. All that would have been required was for Ms. Walker to 
have sent the personal representative some form of "written statement of the claim, indicating its 
basis, the name and address of the claimant, and the amount claimed . . ." Utah Code $75-3- 
804(l)(a). 
Ms Walker's last argument is that because the Estate is still open, no harm will result by 
allowing Plaintiffs claim to be presented four years late. As explained above, this presumes the 
opposite of what has already actually happened to the Estate, namely that no other presently 
unknown minor will come forward years from now to make the same request. Moreover, the Estate 
has disallowed three other late-filed claims. Excusing Plaintiffs late presentment on equitable 
grounds will open the door for the other three disallowed claimants. Finally, the Estate has already 
- 
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filed and had audited its federal estate tax return. The Estate is in a 50% tax bracket. Payments on 
wrongful death claims are deductible. If the Plaintiffs Claim had been timely filed, the Estate could 
have claimed a larger deduction on the estate tax return, thereby reducing its afier-tax cost of any 
settlement with Plaintiff by 50%. Plaintiff has deprived the Estate of that opportunity by his 
mother's late presentment without undergoing a difficult and expensive procedure to reopen the 
estate tax return and attempting to convince the IRS that this was a valid existing claim that should 
have been deducted in the first place. 
Plaintiff also argues that it is not fair for a minor child to suffer because of the delay or 
neglect of adults in taking steps to preserve his Claim. Yet, the only addt  that could have taken the 
necessary steps for the Plaintiff is Ms. Walker, Plaintiff's own mother, who was the,only one with 
certain knowledge of the paternity of her unborn child. N& has the Estate discriminated against Ms. 
Walker or Plaintiff. The Estate has consistently disallowed every claim presented after the nonclaim 
statute presentment deadline and has consistently conceded the timeliness of all claims presented 
before the deadline. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has not cited any authority, legal or equitable, that would permit the Court to ignore 
. - 
the jurisdictional prerequisite of timely presentment of his wrongful death claim: The lateness of the 
Claim is apparent on the face of the pleadings in this matter. Therefore, the Estate's motion to 
dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint should be granted. 
Dated: November 30,2007 
Representative 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO 
DISMISS COMPLAINT 
GARY WAYNE OSTLER, . 
Deceased. Probate No. 03390 1263 
Judge L. A. Dever 
Adam Kunic Moses Walker ("Adam, Jr."), a minor, by and through his Guardian 
and mother, Melissa M. Walker ("Plaintiff'), and through his legal counsel, Moses 
Lebovits and Mary Jane Whisenant, hereby files this, his Opposition to the Motioh to 
Dismiss Complaint ("Motion") filed in this matter by Douglas L. Stowell, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Gary Wayne Ostler ("Estate"). Plaintiff respectfully 
requests that the Estate's Motion be DENIED. 
. BACKGROUND 
1. Adam, Jr. was conceived by his mother, Plaintiff Melissa Walker, and his 
father, Adam Woodruff Moses ("Adam, Sr."), on or about July 1,2003. 
'2. Adam, Sr. was killed in a tragic plane crash off the coast of Alaska, on 
July 13,2003, approximately two weeks after Adam, Jr.'s conception. At the time of 
Adam, Sr.'s death, Plaintiff did not yet even know that she was pregnant with Adam, Jr. 
3. The plane was piloted by Gary Wayne Ostler~("Ostlery'), who was the 
brother-in-law of Adam, Sr., as Ostler was married to Adam, Sr.'s -sister, Christa Moses- 
Ostler. It is undisputed in this matter that the negligence of Mr. Ostler was the sole cause 
of the fatal crash. 
4, The first Notice to Creditors of Ostler's estate was published on 
september 26,2003. Ninety (90) days after the notice was first published would have 
been approximately December 26,2003. Adam, Jr. was not even born on December 26, 
5.  The birth of Adam, Jr. occurred on March 27,2004. 
6.  Adam, Sr.'s paternity of Adam, ~ r .  was established on April 8,2004. 
7. July 13,2004 was one year after Ostler's death. On this date, Adam, Jr. 
was approximately three months and one week old and the identity of his father had only 
been established for approximately three months. 
ADD 0016 
0 8. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Creditor's Claim against the Estate on behalf of 
Adam, Jr. on ApriI 16,2007, just after Adam, Jr.'s third birthday and before a guardian 
had ever been appointed for him. 
9. The Estate filed a Notice of Disallowance of Claim as to Plaintiffs claim 
on May 2,2007. 
10. Plaintiff was appointkd as Adam, Jr.'s guardian on July 20,2007. 
ARGUMENT 
The instant lawsuit is an action for the wrongful death of Adam Moses, Sr. 
Adam, Sr. was killed on July 13,2003, in the tragic crash of a plane negligently piloted 
by Ostler off the coast of Alaska, when Ostler disregarded the flight plan and not once, 
but twice changed his intended refbeling destination airport. Ostler foolishly and fatally, 
with the lives of five (5) others in his hands, decided to attempt to make it all the way to 
his final destination of Gustavus, Alaska, causing the plane to run out of fuel 12 miles 
short of the airport in open waters. The plane sank in near-freezing ocean water a mile 
from the nearest shore. Four (4) of the plane's six (6) passengers were killed, including 
Adam, Sr. and Ostler. Also killed were Ostler's son, Christopher Ostler, and other 
brother-in-law, Gordon Moses. It is undisputed that the crash was due solely to the 
negligence of Ostler. The National Transportation Safety Board cited the cause of the 
accident as Ostler's "inadequate in-flight decision making process, and failure to refuel 
the airplane prior to fuel exhaustion, which resulted in a total loss of engine power." 
ADD 0017 
* Due to Ostler's negligence, Adam, Jr. must now grow up without his father. His 
mother, Melissa Walker, is doii~g her best to raise Adam, Jr. alone as a single-mother, 
while struggling, and many months failing, to make ends meet as a full time student with 
e 
two part time jobs. 
I. 
THE UTAH WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE, WITH ITS TWO-YEAR 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND TOLLING PROVISION FOR MINORS, 
CONTROLS THIS ACTION 
The statute of limitations for a wrongfkl death action in Utah is two (2) years. 
Utah Code $78-12-28(2). The cause of action accrues at the time of death; hence the 
two-year period begins to run at that time. If the claim holder is a minor, the statute of 
limitations is tolled during his or her minority. Utah Code $78-12-36; Switzer v. 
Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980). Utah Code $ 78-12-36 states: 
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery 
of real property, is at the time the cause of action accrued, either 
under the age of minority or mentally incompetent and 
without a legal guardian, the time of the disability is not a part 
of the time limited for the commencement of the action. 
(Emphasis added.) 
It is undisputed in this matter that Adam, Jr. was, at the time the wrongful death 
cause of action in this case accrued, and still is, a minor. Therefore, under Utah Code $5 
78-12-28(2) and 78-12-36, the statute of limitations on Plaintiffs wrongful death cause 
remains presently tolled. 
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11. 
UTAH CODE 6 75-3-803(1)(a) & (b) ARE INAPPLICABLE BECAUSE 
ADAM WALKER, JR. WAS NOT EVEN BORN 90 DAYS AFTER THE FIRST 
PUBLICATION OF NOTICE TO CREDITORS AND WAS BARELY THREE 
MONTHS OLD WITH NO GUARDIAN ONE YEAR AFTER OSTLER'S DEATH 
The Estate has filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint claiming that Plaintiffs claim 
"was not timely filed and thus did not constitute a properly presented claim in that it was 
filed after the deadline for presenting claims set forth in Utah Code 9 75-3-803(1)." This 
section stipulates that the time limit for presenting claims based on events arising before 
the death of the decedent is the earlier of one year after the decedent's death, Utah Code 9 
75-3-803(1)(a), or ninety (90) days after the first publication of notice to creditors, Utah 
Code fj 75-3-803(1)(b). 
In the Matter of the Estate of Rolando S. Garza, Deceased, 725 P.2d 1328, (Utah 
1986), the guardian of two minor children presented a claim against the estate two days 
before the end of the ninety (90) day period allowed for the presentment of claims after 
the first publication of notice to creditors, but more than three (3) years after their father's 
wrongful death. The Utah Supreme Court held that because the claimants were minors, 
the two-year statute of limitations for wrongfd death actions, Utah Code 9 78-12-28(2), 
was tolled during their minority by Utah Code 9 78-12-36(1), and thus the claim was not 
barred under Utah Code 8 75-3-803(1)(a). Nor did 8 75-3-803(1)(b) bar the claim. 
(Garza, at 1330). The Court stated, "the two-year period being tolled, the wrongful death 
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action is not barred; therefore, the claim is not 'barred earlier by other statute of 
limitations."' (Garza, at 1329). 
In Garza, both minor children were born at the time their father, whose wrongful 
death was at issue, died. Further, both had a guardian appointed to look after their 
interests by the time one year passed after their father's wrongful death. On or about 
December 26,2003, when the ninety (90) days passed after the first publication of Notice 
to Creditors in the instant matter, Adam, Jr. was still a fetus in utero. Adam, Jr. was not 
born until March 27,2004. Therefore, he could not possibly have received the Notice to 
Creditors filed on behalf of the Estate on September 26,2003. When one (1) year passed 
after the date of Ostler's death, Adam, Jr. was an approximately three month and one 
week old infant and the paternity of his deceased father had only been established for 
approximately three months. Unlike the minors in Garza, at both of these points, no 
guardian had been appointed on behalf of Adam, Jr. If the minors in Garza were not 
barred from bringing their claims for the wrongful death of their father, then Adam, Jr. 
certainly should not be barred from making his valid claim against the Estate due to a 
deadline which passed before he was even born or due'to another deadline which passed 
when has was only three months old and had no guardian appointed on his behalf. 
111. 
THE OSTLER FAMILY AND THE ESTATE KEPT PLAINTIFF FROM 
SEEKING AN ATTORNEY BY MAKING REPEATED ASSURANCES TO HER 
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THAT THEY WOULD PROVIDE FOR ADAM, JR. WITHOUT THE 
NECESSITY OF INVOLVING THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
Once Adam, Sr.'s paternity was established, Plaintiff asked for and received 
repeated assurances from the Ostler family, i.e., Adam Jr.'s aunt and Ostler's widow, 
Christa Moses-Ostler, that Adam, Jr. would be taken care of out of the Estate. Plaintiff 
preferred to handle this matter informally as well, and strongly hoped to avoid filing a 
lawsuit against the Estate, since the Ostlers were related to Adam Jr.'s father and had lost 
Mr. Ostler and three (3) other family members in the crash themselves. The Ostlers 
include Adam, Sr.'s sister, Christa Moses-Ostler, who is the widow of the deceased pilot, 
Gary Wayne Ostler, and other members of his family. Plaintiff did not want to sue them. 
She only did so as a last resort after repeated broken promises by the Ostlers and the 
Estate that Adam, Jr. would be provided for. 
One example of the Ostler's empty promises involves a 1965 Ford Mustang 
which belonged to Adam, Sr. Plaintiff was initially promised that the car would go to 
Adam, Jr. Then the Ostlers gave the car to Adam, Sr.'s brother, Aaron Moses, "to hold 
for Adam, Jr." When Mr. Moses sold the Mustang for $12,000.00, Plaintiff was led to 
believe that at least half of the proceeds would go to Adam, Jr.  hen she was told that 
Adam, Jr. would receive "some" of the money. Finally, Plaintiff received a mere 
$700.00 for Adam, Jr. Once it became clear that the Ostlers were only stringing Adam, 
Jr. along, Plaintiff filed a claim against the Estate on Adam, Jr.'s behalf. When Ostler's 
widow, Christa Moses-Ostler, heard that Plaintiff had filed suit on Adam Jr.'s behalf, she 
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made statements to the effect that, "Adam, Jr. won't get anything now because of the 
statute of limitations." If the goal of the Estate and family was to delay Plaintiff in 
making a legal claim long enough to keep from paying anything to Adam, Jr. for the 
death of his father caused by Ostler, then they believed they had succeeded. The Court 
should not allow them to do so. 
IV. 
SINCE THE ESTATE IS STILL OPEN AND HAS NOT BEEN SETTLED, 
NO HARM WILL RESULT OR PUBLIC POLICY BROKEN BY ALLOWING 
ADAM, JR. TO MAKE HIS RIGHTFUL CLAIM TO THE ESTATE 
The policy behind Utah Code $ 75-3-803(1)(a)-@) is to allow estates to become 
finalized, so that they are not disrupted years Iater by claims made after an estate is 
settled. Plaintiff is not asking the Court to disrupt an already settled estate. The Estate is 
not closed and is still pending. 
The Estate had actual notice of Adam, Jr.'s claim well within one (1) year of 
Ostler's death, and the family encouraged Plaintiff well within that year's time not to 
involve the legal system by promising Plaintiff that Adam, Jr. would be taken care of out 
of the Estate. In its motion, the Estate also claims that Adam Jr.'s "mother, 
. . 
grandparents, or any other interested person could have applied for appointment as the 
personal representative of Adam, Sr.'s estate in order to file this wronghl death claim ' 
against the Estate." Adam, Jr., a minor, should not be penalized for the false promises or 
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failure of these adults to apply for appointment as the personal representative of Adam 
Sr.'s estate. 
Since Plaintiff was unable to get the promised cooperation from the Estate, she 
was finally forced to engage an attorney to investigate making a legal claim on Adam, 
Jr.'s behalf. A creditor's claim was filed on April 16,2007, but Adam, Jr. still had no 
legal guardian. A legal guardian was appointed July 20,2007. Adam, Jr. should not be 
punished because he did not have a guardian sooner, especially since allowing him to 
make his claim will not disrupt an already closed and settled estate. 
The Estate inexplicably claims in its motion that it "is not denying the Claim on 
technicality." That is exactly what the Estate is attempting to do. Then the Estate 
summons the nerve to close its motion by accusing a fetus (at the 90 day after publication 
point) or a three month old infant (at the one year point after Ostler's death) of "sitting on 
his rights," as if Adam, Jr. even to this day, has any idea what his rights are. I 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Due to the fact that Adam, Jr. was not born at the time of the death of Adam Sr., 
and still is, a minor, the statute of limitations on his wrongful death claim for the death of 
Adam, Sr. is tolled. Utah Code $ 75-3-801(1)(a) & (b) are inapplicable to this action 
because at the time the ninety (90) day period after publication to creditors period and 
one year period after the decedent's death expired, Adam, Jr. was not yet born and a three 
month and one week old infant with no guardian, respectively. Plaintiff Melissa Walker 
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did not want to sue the Ostlers, and Adam Sr.'s sister, and was promised repeatedly by 
the Ostlers and the Estate that such was not necessary because they would take care of 
Adam, Jr. out of the proceeds of the Estate. As soon as Plaintiff gave up all hope of the 
Ostlers and the Estate making good on their promises to provide for Adam, Jr. after the 
wfongfd death of his father due to the negligence of Ostler, and not until she finally gave 
up such hope, Plaintiff filed this legal action on Adam, Jr.'s behalf. The estate remains 
unsettled, so no harm or violation of public policy will result by allowing Adam, ~ r .  to 
make his rightful claim- 
This document is further supported by the Affidavit of Melissa Walker, filed 
herewith. 
Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully prays that the Court set a date and time for this 
Motion to be heard, and that Estate's Motion to Dismiss Complaint be DENIED. 
DATED this /L/ day of November, 2007. 
- 
M& Jane Whisenant 
Attorneys for Claimant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on this / day of %fl 2007,I caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing to be sent by first class mail to the following: 
Melissa.Wa1ker 
35 1 East 720 South #B 
Orem, UT 84058 
James G.  Swensen, Jr. 
Alan R. Andersen 
SWENSON & ANDERSEN, PLLC 
136 S. Main Street #3 1 8 
Salt Lake City, UT 84 10 1 
ADD 0025 
Alan R. Andersen (39 1 2) 
James G. Swensen (3874) 
SWENSEN & ANDERSEN PLLC 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
136 S. Main St., Suite 3 18 
Salt Lake City, UT 84 101 
Telephone: (801) 364-7500 
Facsimile: (801) 364-75 10 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF I MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 
GARY WAYNE OSTLER, 
Deceased. 
Probate No. 033901263 
Judge L.A. Dever 
Douglas L Stowell, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Gary Ostler (the "Estate"), 
through his legal counsel, Swensen & Andersen PLLC, hereby moves to dismiss the Complaint filed 
on June 29,2007 in this matter (the "Complaint") by Adam Kunic Moses Walker, a minor, by and 
throush his Guardian, Melissa M. Walker. ("Plaintiff'). 
BACKGROUND 
1. Plaintiff filed a creditor's claim against the Estate on April 16,2007 (the "Claim"). The 
Claim is for the wrongful death, and related damages, of Plaintiffs father. Plaintiff is allegedly the 
sole heir of Plaintiffs father. 
2. The Claim alleges that Gary Wayne Ostler, the decedent in this probate Estate 
("Decedent"), caused the death of Plaintiffs father on July 13,2003 by negligently piIoting his 
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Cessna 401 into the waters of the Pacific Ocean resulting in the simultaneous deaths of the Decedent, 
Plaintiffs father, and others. 
3. On May 2,2007, the Estate filed a Notice of Disallowance of Claim, disallowing the 
Claim on the grounds that it was not timely filed and thus did not constitute a properly presented 
claim in that it was filed after the deadline for presenting claims set forth in Utah Code 9 75-3- 
803(1).' 
4. The Plaintiff then filed the Complaint that is the subject of this Motion to Dismiss on 
June 29,2007. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Complaint is clearly barred by Utah Code $ 75-3-804(1)(b), which provides that 
"the claimant may commence a proceeding against the personal representative in any court where the 
personal representative may be subjected to jurisdiction to obtain payment of the claim against the 
estate, but the commencement of the proceeding must occur within the time limited for presenting 
the claim." (emphasis added). 
2. The time limit for presenting claims based on events arising before the death of the 
Decedent (Decendent allegedly caused the crash minutes before his own death) is the earlier of one 
year after Decedent's death or 90 days after first publication of notice to creditors. Utah Code 9 75- 
3-803(1). 
1 The Estate also disallowed the Claim in the grounds that no guardian had been appointed for the Plaintiff. However, a 
Guardian has subsequently been properly appointed and the Estate now drops that ground for disallowance. 
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3. Decedent died on July 13,2003 md notice to creditors was first published on 
September 26,2003. Thus the deadline for Plaintiffs Claim was the earlier of December 26,2003 
(next business day after 90 days after creditor notice) or July 13,2004 (one year after date of death). 
4. Therefore, even giving Plaintiff the benefit of the &r of the two deadlines, Plaintiff 
was required to file a properly presented claim, or to commence legal proceedings against the Estate, 
no later than July 13,2004. Yet Plaintiff did not file the claim until April 16,2007, over three years 
late. 
5. The time limitations of Utah Code 5 75-3-803 clearly apply to this wrongful death 
claim. The statute itself refers to claims "whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, 
liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not ban-ed earlier by other 
statute of limitations . , . ." Utah Code $ 75-3-803 (emphasis added). Thus this time limit applies 
to tort claims and also supersedes any tolling of the regular time limit on bringing wrongful death 
claims that may exist because of Plaintiffs legal incapacity as a minor. 
6.  Nor can Plaintiff validly argue that his minority creates any unfairness or harshness in 
the application of this absolute Probate Code time limit because wrongful death claims for the death 
of a person are permitted to be brought either by "his heirs, or his personal representative for the 
benefit of his heirs." Utah Code $ 78-1 1-7. Therefore, Plaintiffs mother, Plaintiffs father's 
parents, or any other interested person could have applied for appointment as the personal 
representative of Plaintiffs deceased father in order to file this wrongful death claim against the 
Estate. 
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7. Moreover, even disregarding this option of having a personal representative appointed 
a to preserve Plaintiffs claim, Plaintiff was born alive on March 27,2004 and DNA testing for 
paternity was completed on April 8,2004, yet neither Plaintiffs mother nor any other interested 
person took any action to file the Claim until over three years later. Thus, the Estate is not denying 
the Claim on a technicality. Rather, it would be grossly unjust to the Estate and its beneficiaries to 
permit Plaintiff to bring this Claim after sitting on his rights for over three years. 
a CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Personal Representative move to dismiss the Complaint on the 
grounds that it was not timely filed. 
a 
Dated: July 27,2007 
a 
Douglas L. Stowell, Personal Representative 
307 East Stanton Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 841 1 1 
Representative 
K awY- 
Alan R. Andersen, Attorney for Personal 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
a I hereby certify that on July 27,2007, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION 
TO DISMISS COMPLAINT to be mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
David W. Slaughter 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
0 10 Exchange Place, 1 1 th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84 145 
Attorneys for Christa M. Ostler 
0 John L. Valentine 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen, P.C. 
120 East 300 North 
PO Box 1248 
Provo, UT' 84603 
Attorneys for: Stephanie Dawn Ostler Gunn 
Michelle Roberge Ostler Shumway 
Nathan Gary Ostler 
Heather Ann Ostler 
Holly Brooke Ostler 
Tonda Ostler (Pro Se) 
5796 West 10620 North 
Highland, UT 84003 
Mary Jane Whisenant #8444 
Moses Lebovitz, Pro Hac Vice 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 1 1 
Attorneys for: Melissa M. Walker, Guardian 
of Adam Kunic Moses Walker 
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T 
Mary Jane Whisenant, #8444 
Moses Lebovita: Pro Hac Vice 
Attorneys for Claimant 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 1 1 
Telephone No. (80 1) 994-029 1 
FacsimileNo. (801) 534-1948 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE : COMPLAINT 
GARY WAYNE OSTLER, : Probate No. 033901263 
Deceased. : Judge L. A. Dever 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. ADAM KUNIC MOSES WALKER, a minor, by and through his 
Guardian, MELISSA M. WALKER, constitutes all of the heirs at law of ADAM 
WOODRUFF MOSES, deceased. 
2. Defendants DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, are sued herein under 
fictitious names because their true names and capacities, whether individual, 
associate, corporate, governmental, or otherwise are unknown to Plaintiff. 
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Plaintiff will ask leave of this court to amend this Complaint to assert their true 
names and capacities when the same are ascertained. 
2. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each of the 
defendants designated herein as a DOE or named are negligently, carelessly, 
recklessly, strictly or otherwise responsible in some manner for the events and 
happenings herein referred to and caused damages directly and proximately 
thereby to Plaintiff. The Defendants are sued as principals and/or agents, servants 
and employees of said principals and all of the acts performed as agents and 
employees were performed within the course and scope of their authority and 
employment and/or agency and with the consent of each of the Defendants. 
3. Plaintiff brings this action in that his decedent father, Adam 
Woodruff Moses, was killed in a crash of a Cessna 401 airplane on a personal 
flight to Gustavus, Alaska on July 13,2003. Said airplane was owned and flown . 
by Gary Wayne Ostler, deceased. Mr. Ostler was the only licensed pilot in the 
aircraft, and as such owed a duty to his invited guests to do all within his power to 
ensure safe passage of his passengers to the appointed destination. 
4. At all times herein mentioned, Defendant GARY WAYNE 
OSTLER (deceased), was a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
5 .  At all times herein mentioned, Defendant ESTATE OF SHIP OF 
GARY WAYNE OSTLER, and DOES 1 through 50, is a probate estate filed in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah. 
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6. At all times herein mentioned each Defendant was the agent of each 
0 and all of the other defendants herein and was acting within the course and scope 
of its agency and with consent. 
7. The conduct of each defendant herein combined and cooperated with 
the conduct of other defendants herein so as to cause the above described air crash 
and resulting damages to Plaintiff. 
8. On July 13,2003, Gary Wayne Ostler was piloting his Cessna 401 
airplane on a personal flight to Gustavus, Alaska. Mr. Ostler was operating as an 
instrument flight rules (IFR) cross county personal flight under Part 9 1. In 
contravention of the flight plan filed by Mr. Ostler, in which he scheduled a 
refueling stop in Ketchikan, Alaska, Mr. Ostler negligently failed to refuel his 
aircraft, causing it to crash into the waters of the Pacific Ocean. That crash 
resulted in the death of Mr. Ostler and three of his passengers, including Adam 
Woodruff Moses, the father of Adam Kunic Moses Walker. 
9. Gary Wayne Ostler was the only pilot in the airplane and his 
passenger, decedent Adam Woodruff Moses, had no aviation experience. 
Accordingly, Ostler owed a non-delegable duty of safe passage to his invited 
guest, Adam Woodruff Moses. As pilot in command Ostler was in charge of the 
safe operation of his aircraft, and as such, breached his duty of care owed to 
decedent Adam Woodruff Moses by failing to refuel the aircraft. Defendant 
further failed to impose measures to ensure the safety of decedent Adam Woodruff 





Gary Wayne Ostler reported to the ARTCC Specialist that "both engines were out 
of gas". Oster was approximately 12 miles short of his destination of Gustavus, 
Alaska. 
10. A subsequent investigation conducted by the National 
Transportation Safety Board determined that the cause of the crash and the 
resulting deaths was "(t)he pilot's inadequate in-flight decision making process, 
and failure to rehe1 the airplane prior to fuel exhaustion, which resulted in a total 
loss of engine power." Thus, Defendant's conduct was the sole and proximate 
cause of the accident and the sole and proximate cause of the untimely and violent 
death of decedent Adam Woodruff Moses. Prior to his death, decedent Adam 
Woodruff Moses suffered extreme fear and emotional distress, as well as pain and 
injuries. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence - Wrongful Death) 
1 1. Plaintiff re-alleges each and every allegation contained in those 
paragraphs of this Complaint and designed 1 through 11 with the same force and 
effect as if hereinafter set forth in full and at length. 
12. At all times relevant hereto each defendant failed to skillfully, 
properly and in a workmanlike manner perform all undertakings pursuant to 
common law, federal regulations, state regulations or other law. 
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13. At the time and place previously described the Defendants andor all 
or any one of them in violation of their duty to the Plaintiff and his decedent were 
negligent as set forth above and further in the following particulars, among others: 
(a) In failing to take such remedial measures, to correct defects 
that were actually or constructively known, as the law and safe 
practice required; 
(b) In failing to refuel the aircraft; 
(c) In failing to impose measures to ensure the safety of decedent 
and the other passengers in the aircraft; 
(c) In failing to comply with the regulations and standards of the 
Federal Aviation Agency and/or of \other federal and state regulatory 
agencies; 
(d) In failing to safely and adequately own, operate, maintain, 
service, without being limited thereto, to the aircraft, and the engine 
components thereof. 
14. Prior to the crash, the airplane's engine failed, whole or in part, due 
to the lack of fuel, thereby failing to give the pilot enough power to extricate him 
from the circumstances in which he found himself, without being limited thereto, 
and was thereby caused andor contributed to the crash herein. 
15. Defendants, and each of them, knew or in the exercise of reasonable 
care should have known and discovered that said aircraft was dangerously low on 
he1 and that it was unsafe for the use and purpose for which it was intended when 
- 
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used as recommended by said defendants, and each of them. The decedent herein 
ADAM WOODRUFF MOSES, was unaware of the dangerous nature of said 
aircraft nor was it made known to him. 
16. As a direct and legal result of the negligence, carelessness and other 
tortious, unlawhl and wrongful acts and conduct of the Defendants, and each of 
them, and of their respective agents, servants, employees and authorized 
representatives as aforesaid, Plaintiffs decedent was killed, and, as a result, the 
Plaintiff has suffered loss of financial support, have been deprived of the support 
and contributions from past and future earnings, accumulations, and inheritance, 
and loss of services, love, comfort affection, companionship, guidance, society, 
care, solace, grief and sorrow, and moral support of a kind and loving father, all to 
his general damages in a sum well in excess of the jurisdictional minimum of this 
Court. 
17. As a result of such negligence and in consequence of the death of 
ADAM WOODRUFF MOSES, the Plaintiff was caused and continues to suffer 
from grief, sorrow and mental anguish, from the psychological and physical 
affects of psychic shock and from and the loss of moral support, among other 
things. The general damages suffered by the Plaintiff exceed the jurisdictional 
minimum of this Court. 
18. As a result of the foregoing, the Plaintiff has suffered damages, 
general and special, economic and pecuniary, and injuries, intangible and psychic, 
in amounts to be determined upon proof at the time of trial. 
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendants, and 
0 each of them on the First Cause of Action as follows: 
1 .  For general damages for the death of ADAM WOODRUFF 
MOSES, the loss of his support and contributions from future earnings, 
0 
accumulations, inheritance, etc. for the loss of love, affection, services, comfort, 
protection, care, society, advice, counsel, grief and sorrow, and mental anguish, 
psychological and physical effects of psychic shock, and guidance in an amount 
well in excess of the jurisdictional minimum of this Court; 
2. For damages for the wrongful death of ADAM WOODRUFF 
MOSES as alleged herein, in accordance with the evidence, proof and the law; 
3. For other damages that may be proper and allowable under the law; 
4. For costs of suit incurred herein and prejudgment interest; 
5 .  For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and 
proper in this premises. 
DATED this day of June, 2007. 
~ @ a n e  Whisenant 
Attorney for Claimant 
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LEXSTAT UTAH CODE ANN. 75-3-803 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2008 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
*** This document reflects changes received through the 2008 General Session *** 
*** Annotations current through 2008 UT 32 (412512008); 2008 UT APP 144 *** 
*** (412.512008) and May 15,2008 (Federal Cases) *** 
TITLE 75. UTAH UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
CHAPTER 3. PROBATE OF WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION 
PART 8. CREDITORS' CLAIMS 
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory 
Utah Code Ann. j 75-3-803 (2008) 
5 75-3-803. Limitations on presentation of claims 
Page 1 
(1) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of the decedent, including claims of the state 
and any subdivision of it, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on 
contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not barred earlier by other statute of limitations, are barred against the estate, the 
personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented within the earlier of the following 
dates: 
(a) one year after the decedent's death; or 
(b) within the time provided by Subsection 75-3-801(2) for creditors who are given actual notice, and where no- 
tice is published, within the time provided in Subsection 75-3-801(1) for all claims barred by publication. 
(2) In all events, claims barred by the nonclaim statute at the decedent's domicile are also barred in this state. 
(3) All claims against a decedent's estate which arise at or after the death of the decedent, including claims of the 
state and any of its subdivisions, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, 
founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and 
devisees of the decedent, unless presented as follows: 
(a) a claim based on a contract with the personal representative within three months after performance by the per- 
sonal representative is due; or 
(b) any other claim within the later of three months after it arises, or the time specified in Subsection (])(a). 
(4) Nothing in this section affects or prevents: 
(a) any proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge, or other lien upon property of the estate; 
(b) to the limits of the insurance protection only, any proceeding to establish liability of the decedent or the per- 
sonal representative for which he is protected by liability insurance; or 
(c) collection of compensation for services rendered and reimbursement for expenses advanced by the personal 
representative or by the attorney or accountant for the personal representative of the estate. 
HISTORY: C. 1953,75-3-803, enacted by L. 1975, ch. 150, $ 4 ;  1992, ch. 179, § 7. 
NOTES: 
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Page 2 
Utah Code Ann. 5 75-3-803 
EDITORIAL BOARD COMMENT. --There was some disagreement among the reporters over whether a short period 
of limitations, or of nonclairn, should be provided for claims arising at or after death. Subsection (2) [now (3)] was fi- 
nally inserted because most felt it was desirable to accelerate the time when unadjudicated distributions would be final. 
The time limits stated would not, of course, affect any personal liability in contract, tort, or by statute, of the personal 
representative. Under 75-3-808 a personal representative is not liable on transactions entered into on behalf of the 
estate unless he agrees to be personally liable or unless he breaches a duty by making the contract. Creditors of the es- 
tate and not of the personal representative thus face a special limitation that runs four months after performance is due 
from the personal representative. Tort claims normally will involve casualty insurance of the decedent or of the personal 
representative, and so will fall within the exception of subsection (3)[now (4)J If a personal representative is personally 
at fault in respect to a tort claim arising after the decedent's death, his personal liability would not be affected by the 
running of the special short period provided here. 
The limitation stated in subdivision (l)(b) pefore the 1992 amendment] dovetails with the three-year limitation pro- 
vided in § 75-3-107 to eliminate most questions of succession that are controlled by state law after three years from 
death have elapsed. Questions of interpretation of any will probated within such period, or of the identity of heirs in 
intestacy are not barred, however. 
COORDINATING CLAUSE. --Laws 1992, ch. 179,g 18 provides: "The amendments to Sections 75-3-801, 75-3-803, 
75-3-806, 75-3-807, 75-3-1003, and 75-3-1006 shall apply only to the estates of decedents who die on or after the effec- 
tive date of this act [July 1, 19921. All other amendments shall be effective for all estates upon the effective date of this 
act." 
CROSS-REFERENCES. --Death of party after verdict or decision and before judgment, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
58A (e). 








Sufficiency of claim. 
Summary distribution. 
Time for presentation. 
Cited. 
CONSTRUCTION. 
This section and f 75-3-804 should be applied'to facilitate settlement of estates without unduly restricting the rights of 
timely claimants who in good faith endeavor to comply with the requirements of the statute. Quinn v. Qirinn, 772 P.2d 
979 (Utah Ct. App. 198a). 
CONTINGENT CLAIMS. 
Contingent claims of surviving members of unsettled partnership business could not be presented against estate of 
deceased partners without.accounting. Sharp v. Sharp, 54 Utah 262, 180 P. 580 (1919) (decided under former statute). 
The term "contingent claim," as employed and used in former statute which provided for payment of claims contin- 
gent or not due, was not intended to have any application in case of dissolution of partnership by death of one of its 
members in winding up and settlement of its affairs. Sharp v. Sharp, 54 Utah 262, 180 P. 580 (1919). 
C!aim arising from deceased's contract to allow plaintiff to manage building owned by deceased, and refusal by ex- 
ecutors to allow such management, was contingent claim required by former statute to be presented within time stated in 
notice; fact that claim did not arise until executors refused to allow plaintiff to perform contract which was after time for 
presentation had passed did not excuse late presentation. Halloran-Judge Trusr Co. v. Heath, 70 Utah 124, 258 P. 342, 
64 A.L.R. 368 (1927). 
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FILMG OF CLAIM. 
Plaintiff claiming alleged rentals due from estate of decedent was not entitled to have decree of distribution set aside 
on ground that executrix of decedent's will misrepresented the facts in her petition when she alleged that "all claims 
filed in time or at all" had been paid, where plaintiff not only had statutory notice of the petition for distribution, its con- 
tents, and the appraisal, but had filed its claim long before, reflecting an acquaintance with the pendency of the probate. 
In re Beck's Estate, 13 Utah 2d 222. 371 P.2d 551 (1962) (decided under former statutes). 
LIENS. 
Attorney employed by decedent on contingent fee basis to sue on insurance contract had lien on sums recovered in 
such action in hands of administrator; former probate provisions relating to presentment of unsecured claims were inap- 
plicable. In re Agee's Estate, 69 Utah 130, 252 P. 891, 50 A.L.R. 64 1 (1 927). 
MMOR CLAIMANTS. 
A claim presented two days before the end of the three-month period allowed for the presentment of claims after pub- 
lication of notice to creditors but more than three years after the death of the decedent was timely where the claimants 
were minors and, since the two-year statute of limitation was tolled during their minority, their claim was "not barred 
earlier by other statute of limitations." In re Estate of Gana, 725 P.2d 1328 (Utah 1986). 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
Since an action against the estate for specific performance of decedent's agreement to sell real estate is not a "claim" 
subject to the requirements of this section, claim for attorney fees incident to such action for specific performance is not 
subject to the requirements of this section. In re Estate of Shepley, 645 P.2d 605 (Utah 1982). 
The term "claims," under this section, does not include claims for specific performance; therefore, the stahte of limi- 
tations of this section is not applicable to an action for specific performance. Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 
1982). 
Demand against decedent's estate asserting that property was sold to claimant by deceased and asking the court to 
order the administrator to make a suitable conveyance was a petition for specific performance of a contract to convey 
property and was not subject to the limitation for presenting claims against an estate. In re Estate upharp, 537 P.2d 
1034 (Utah 1975). 
SUFFICIENCY OF CLAIM. 
Claim against estate was sufficient that gave the personal representative all the information he needed to investigate 
. the claim and decide whether to pay it, fight it, or settle it. Quinn v. Quinn, 772 P.2d979 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
a Surviving wife's claim as a creditor under an antenuptial agreement was barred by her failure to make the claim within 
one year. Merely providing the estate representative with a copy of the agreement, without explaining how the agree- 
ment had been breached or the amount the wife was claiming as a creditor under the agreement, did not. satisfy the re- 
quirements of § 75-3-804. In re Estate of Uzelac, 2005 UTApp 234, 526 Utah A h .  Rep. 33, 114 P.3d 1164. 
SUMMARY DISTRIBUTION. 
Although widow had claim against estate of deceased husband for voluntary payment of deceased's obligations, fu- 
neral expense and expense of last illness, she could not claim amounts of such payments to reduce the value of the 
property of the estate so as to entitle her to summary distribution of the estate under the exemptions allowed by former 
statute. Columbia Trust Co. v. Anglum, 63 Utah 353, 225 P. 1089 (1924). 
TIME FOR PRESENTATION. 
In suit by executors of deceased partner against legal representatives of surviving partners for partition of partnership 
mining property, wherein personal representatives of surviving partners sought to counterclaim for money paid out by 
surviving partners for partnership debts and obligations, representatives of surviving partners were not barred by laches 
from presentingclaim in partition suit for failure to file claim zgainst deceased partner, where plaintiffs suffered no 
prejudice by lapse of time. Sharp v. Sharp. 54 Utah 262, 180 P. 580 (1919). 
Where claims were barred for failure to file on time under former Probate Code, administratrix was without power to 
pay them, and any money paid thereon would be considered to come from her personal funds, and could not be consid- 
ered as deduction from inheritance tax. Jones v. State Tar Comrn'n, 99 Utah 373, 104 P.2d 210 (1940). 
Claims had to be filed, after proper notice, within time limit of former statute, or be forever barred. Jones v. State Tar 
Comrn'n, 99 Utah 373, 104 P.2d 210 (1940). 
- 
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Purpose of former statute requiring presentation of claims within time stated in notice was to require publication of 
notice to creditors so as to shorten limitation period, and not to lengthen it because of neglect on part of personal repre- 
sentative or delay on part of creditor. Gray Realty Co. v. Robinson, I 1  I Utah 521, 184 P.2d237 (1947). 
Notice to creditors by administratrix, indicating that claims against estate could be filed before certain date did not 
constitute waiver or abandonment of defense of general statute of limitations available to administratrix in action by 
creditor. Gray Realty Co. v. Robinson, 111 Utah 521, 184 P.2d 237 (1947). 
Former statute requiring presentation of claims within time stated in notice was not a bar to action to impreis judg- 
ment lien on property, where complaint alleged that property had been transferred to defraud creditors, and that property 
was held in hust for defendant. Moulton v. Morgan. 115 Utah 119, 202 P.2d 723 (1949). 
CITED in In re Estate of Larson, 750 P.2d 604 (Utah 1988); DeMentas v. Estate of Tallas, 764 P.2d 628 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AM. JUR. 2D. --31 Am. Jur. 2d Executors and Administrators $$633 to 640. 
C.J.S. --34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators $9 405 to 408. 
A.L.R. --Relation back of appointment of administrator, running of statute of limitations as affected by doctrine of, 3 
. 
A.L.R.3d 1234. 
Tort claim as within nonclaim statutes, 22 A.L.R.3d 493. 
Delay in appointing administrator or other representative, effect on cause of action accruing at or after death of person 
in whose favor it would have accrued, 28 A.L.R.3d 1 14 1. 
Counterclaim or setoff, presentation of claim to executor or administrator as prerequisite of its availability as, 36 
A.L.R.3d 693. 
Limitations of actions applicable to action by trustees of employee benefit plan to enforce delinquent employer contri- 
butions under ERISA (29 USCSJ 1132 (a)), 90 A:L.R. Fed. 374. 
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chapter, subtitle, 
or title. 
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78-1236. Effect of disa bility. 
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real property, is at the time the cause of action accrued, either 
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the time of the disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. 
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